Part 3 of 5
Throughout 1968 and well into 1969, as the Communists sought to
continue the General Offensive, destroying the "Puppet Government at
all levels" and liquidating "stubborn ringleaders and tyrants" remained
high on the list of important missions. (73) Documents produced in the
fall and winter of 1968 continued to emphasized that "revolutionary
violence" would determine the success of the political struggle and that
it was the most efficient means for advancing political movements in
the cities and towns. (74) A directive of November 10, 1968, attributed
to the Political Department of MR V Headquarters stated that the main
mission of guerrilla and self-defense forces was to cooperate with
district and city units in annihilating the GVN's structure in cities,
towns, and surrounding areas; eliminating enemy administrative
personnel, police, pacification cadres, and Popular Force cadres; and
thus provoking civilian uprising. (75) A Top Secret plan dated
December 12, 1968, believed to have been issued by an agency of Binh
Dinh Province, directed that all government administrative and
intelligence personnel who attempted to oppose the political struggles
and uprising of the masses be killed at any price. (76)
In attacking on urban areas, some units were ordered to concentrate on
senior GVN commanders and officials. For example, a June 1968
directive prepared by a unit of the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region stated
that
"the selection of important and key targets has a great significance
affecting our common victory. We should, according to each town and
city, select . . . targets such as the Puppet troops and government's
ringleaders; Province Chiefs, Civil Guard Provincial Group
Commanders, Security Service Chiefs, Mayors, Army Corps
Commanders, Division Commanders, etc . . . . with their
(administrative) machinery. (77)
Other units were instructed to concentrate on the very lowest levels of
the organizational structure and proceed on a street-by-street basis to
systematically root out and eliminate "reactionary" elements. Thus, a
Viet Cong plan captured in November 1968, which outlined
forthcoming operations against the capital of Ben Tre Province, directed
local armed reconnaissance units to "update" their blacklists of lower-
level GVN personnel I "each area inside and outside the city" and then
proceed to eliminate these persons. Specifically,
"There must be plan to kill from three to five [reactionary elements] and
put out of action from five to ten others on each street, in each bloc of
houses. Loosen the enemy's oppressive control machinery, destroy 70%
of the administrative personnel in the area. Tyrants are to be cut down
and warning notices sent to (undesirable) elements forcing them to
resign their posts." (78)
The setting of quotas on the number of government persons to be
eliminated by individual units was characteristic of the General
Offensive period. A sapper unit in the Quang Da Special Zone, for
example, was instructed to kill a total of 100 tyrants; (79) a district
force in Thua Thien Province was ordered to "completely destroy . . .
200 tyrants." (80) A captured letter dated July 1968 concerning the
conduct of security activities in Ben Tre Province called upon
components of the Security Service to try to destroy 50 percent of the
GVN's administrative, police, and public security agencies at provincial,
city, and district levels during a forthcoming phase of the offensive. Key
cadres from the police, security, military, intelligence, and
psychological warfare agencies, along with village and hamlet
administrative council members, were pinpointed as the main targets for
liquidation. (81)
Continue with Text
References
(73) For example, Doc. Log No. 01-2766-69 (Confidential),
summarized in MACJ2 Bulletin No. 20,197, dated January 20, 1969,
and Doc. Log No. 01-2818-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2
Bulletin No. 20,230, dated January 31, 1969.
(74) Doc. Log No. 11-1771-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2
Bulletin No. 18,033, dated November 19, 1968. Summary of a
"Recapitulation Report" dated October 30, 1968, which reviews the
political struggle movement in Binh Dinh Province during the months
prior to October 20, 1968, and provides lessons for future political
struggles. Captured by the Capital ROK Infantry Division on November
6, 1968.
(75) Doc. Log No. 01-2762-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2
Bulletin No. 20,195, dated January 30, 1969. Summary of a directive
dated November 10, 1968, which provides guidance to province units
concerning the tasks of guerrilla and self-defense units during a
forthcoming campaign. This directive is attributed to the Political
Department, Headquarters, Military Region V. Captured by the Capital
ROK Infantry Division on January 4, 1969.
(76) Doc. Log No. 01-2773-69 (Confidential),summarized in MACJ2
Bulletin No. 20,203, dated January 30, 1969. Summary of a Top Secret
plan dated December 12, 1968, attributed to an agency of the Binh Dinh
Province Unit, Military Region V, which provides guidance on military
proselytizing activities in a forthcoming campaign. Captured by the
Capital ROK Infantry Division on January 4, 1969.
(77) Doc. Log No. 10-1003-68 (Confidential), dated November 23,
1968. Translation of directive (in draft form) dated June 19, 1968,
concerning the "Strategy and Tactics of Launching Permanent and
Continuous Attacks Against the Enemy During Military Campaigns and
Operations." This directive is believed to have been prepared by the Tri-
Thien-Hue Military Region. Captured by the 196th Light Infantry
Brigade, Americal Division, on September 9, 1968.
(78) Doc. Log No. 11-1520-68.
(79) Doc. Log No. 07-3297-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2
Bulletin No. 15,030, dated July 31, 1968. Summary of an undated
attack plan prepared by an agency in the Quang Da Special Zone, with
details for an attack to be launched against an unspecified city.
Captured by the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, on July
23, 1968.
(80) Doc. Log No. 08-1045-68 (Confidential), dated August 15, 1968.
Translation of a notebook dated June 30, 1968, concerning the activities
of district agencies in Thua Thien Province. Captured by the 1st USMC
Division, III MAF, on July 21, 1968.
(81) Doc. Log No. 02-5567-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2
Bulletin No. 16, dated March 6, 1969. Summary of letter dated July
1968, and containing instructions on the conduct of security activities in
Ben Tre city and its outskirts during a forthcoming phase of hostilities.
This letter is attributed to the Security Section, Ben Tre Province Unit,
Military Region II. Captured by the 9th U.S. Infantry Division in
February 1969.
Glossary
ARVN: Army Republic of Vietnam
CDEC: Combined Document Exploitation Center
CIO: Central Intelligence Organization
COSVN: Central Office of South Vietnam
GVN: Government of South Vietnam
MP: Military Police
MPS: Ministry of Public Security
MR: Military Region
MSS: Military Security Service
RVN: Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SVN: South Vietnam
USMC: United States Marines Corp.
VNQDD: Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang