Viet-Cong concept of the general Offensive

Courtesy: Le, thanh nam Source: Soc.Culture.VietNamese Part 2 of 5 in the course of the offensive, a concerted effort was also made to induce the local populace to participate in the repressive process by assisting the viet cong in tracking down "tyrants" and eliminating gvn officials. a high-level training document from this period emphasized that "the substance of the present political struggle is not 'to stage demonstrations to present petitions' but to make use of violence to overthrow the enemy government and to establish the people's revolutionary administration." it went to say: "Therefore, the key problem is making preparations and motivating the masses to seethingly arise (in coordination with the military offensive) to annihilate cruel tyrants and wicked administrative personnel and spies, to smash the puppet government and the enemy reactionary machinery, to establish the revolutionary administration and to quickly develop the people's revolutionary forces. to perform this task well, it is necessary to work out uprising plans for each local area (particularly for the villages) in a very concrete and careful manner and make them thoroughly understood by all party members and popular organizations and to ensure that offensive and uprising plans, for local areas, will include offensives, uprising and also enemy troop proselytizing activities. in these plans, it is necessary to specify the specific mission of each party cell, each organization cell and each party member concerning the annihilation of cruel tyrants, ring leaders, spies and lackeys of the enemy in district seats, towns and cities as well as special mission agents, to eradicate all forms of oppressive enemy revolutionary administration; to develop popular organizations, which should be viewed as a decisive link i the motivation and leadership of the masses to arise and seize and hold the powers." (69) an activity plan of february 5 outlined how the masses were to be motivated and organized to "annihilate" government persons, including pacification cadres and to track down the "remnants of the enemy troops": "We must continuously motivate the masses to track down and completely annihilate puppet government agents and installations in the rural area (including all of the pacification forces). Then, we must track down and completely annihilate key personnel of the administration at district and province levels and partially annihilate the central level (including the intelligence, espionage and security networks) to completely break the enemy's oppressive control [over the population]. we must destroy the entire reactionary political forces in towns, cities and district capitals and continue to liberate the remaining jails and prisons. we must also set up liberation committees in various wards, districts, provinces, and cities which have been occupied by our forces. we must quickly consolidate and expand the [revolutionary] government at its very foundation and formulate various policies. we must quickly increase the number of efficient political agents among the masses on a broad and firm basis, and teach them how to master the situation in towns and cities. we must quickly organize the masses to make them participate in all tasks concerning town and city administration such as: tracking down the remnants of the enemy troops; suppressing anti-revolutionary elements; maintaining order and security; organizing civil anti-aircraft defense, administering public services necessary for the livelihood of the people and combat activities of our troops, etc. [sic] . . . . " (70) to precipitate local uprising, communist front organizations disseminated appeals to the masses to annihilate their gvn oppressors. one such appeal, issued by the saigon-gia dinh united liberation youth Association, urged people and students in the saigon area to courageously stand up and suppress tyrants; punish the police and security agents, informants, and "wicked persons"; and accuse the chiefs of city wards and interfamilies of cruelty. (71) despite such urging and efforts to foment popular uprising, the Communists' attempts to enlist the support of local populations in their offensive apparently met with very little success. Indeed, communist postmortems of the tet offensive mentioned this failure to spark popular participation as one of the major shortcomings of the campaign. (71) Continue with Text
References
 (69) Doc. log No. 05-2068-68 (Confidential), dated june 19, 1968 (emphasis added). translation of an undated training document pertaining to the implementation of the 6th cosvn resolution by all levels of the Party. the document was titled "Requirement and purpose of the study of the sixth resolution of nam Truong" and was presumably prepared at a high level. captured by the 1st U.S. infantry division on may 6, 1968. (70) Doc. log No. 02-2083-68 (Confidential), dated february 28, 1968 (emphasis added). translation of an activity plan which provides an assessment of the progress achieved during the first seven days of the tet offensive and outlines plans for the continuation of that offensive. the document was entitled "Capitalize on our victories to dash forward and continuously attack the Enemy, with a strong determination to gain final Victory," and was prepared on february 5, 1968, at an otherwise unspecified current affairs party committee meeting. (The contents of the document would suggest that the issuing agency may have been the current affairs committee of COSVN.) captured by the 25th U.S. infantry division on february 24, 1968. (71) Doc. log No. 04-2670-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 11,665, dated april 22, 1968. summary of an undated "appeal" published by the saigon-gia dinh united liberation youth association and addressed to the people and student so the saigon-gia dinh area. captured by the combined mp Tm, CMD, rvnaf iii CTZ, on april 21, 1968. (72) for example Doc. log No. 05-2819-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 12,883, dated may 30, 1968, published by the propaganda-training section of subregion 1 as a training lesson for cadres and party members on how to master the main problems in the motivation of the populace to revolt. captured by the 1st U.S. infantry division on may 21, 1968. Continue with Text
Glossary
ARVN: army republic of vietnam CDEC: combined document exploitation center CIO: central intelligence organization COSVN: central office of south vietnam GVN: government of south vietnam MP: military police MPS: ministry of public security MR: military region MSS: military security service RVN: republic of vietnam RVNAF: republic of vietnam armed forces SVN: south vietnam USMC: united states marines Corp. VNQDD: vietnam quoc dan dang 

Part 3 of 5 throughout 1968 and well into 1969, as the communists sought to continue the general Offensive, destroying the "Puppet government at all levels" and liquidating "stubborn ringleaders and tyrants" remained high on the list of important missions. (73) documents produced in the fall and winter of 1968 continued to emphasized that "revolutionary violence" would determine the success of the political struggle and that it was the most efficient means for advancing political movements in the cities and towns. (74) a directive of november 10, 1968, attributed to the political department of mr v headquarters stated that the main mission of guerrilla and self-defense forces was to cooperate with district and city units in annihilating the GVN's structure in cities, towns, and surrounding areas; eliminating enemy administrative personnel, police, pacification cadres, and popular force cadres; and thus provoking civilian uprising. (75) a top secret plan dated december 12, 1968, believed to have been issued by an agency of binh dinh Province, directed that all government administrative and intelligence personnel who attempted to oppose the political struggles and uprising of the masses be killed at any price. (76) in attacking on urban areas, some units were ordered to concentrate on senior gvn commanders and officials. for example, a june 1968 directive prepared by a unit of the tri-thien-hue military region stated that "the selection of important and key targets has a great significance affecting our common victory. we should, according to each town and city, select . . . targets such as the puppet troops and government's ringleaders; province Chiefs, civil guard provincial group Commanders, security service Chiefs, Mayors, army corps Commanders, division Commanders, etc . . . . with their (administrative) machinery. (77) other units were instructed to concentrate on the very lowest levels of the organizational structure and proceed on a street-by-street basis to systematically root out and eliminate "reactionary" elements. Thus, a viet cong plan captured in november 1968, which outlined forthcoming operations against the capital of ben tre Province, directed local armed reconnaissance units to "update" their blacklists of lower- level gvn personnel i "each area inside and outside the city" and then proceed to eliminate these persons. Specifically, "There must be plan to kill from three to five [reactionary elements] and put out of action from five to ten others on each street, in each bloc of houses. loosen the enemy's oppressive control machinery, destroy 70% of the administrative personnel in the area. tyrants are to be cut down and warning notices sent to (undesirable) elements forcing them to resign their posts." (78) the setting of quotas on the number of government persons to be eliminated by individual units was characteristic of the general offensive period. a sapper unit in the quang da special Zone, for example, was instructed to kill a total of 100 tyrants; (79) a district force in thua thien province was ordered to "completely destroy . . . 200 tyrants." (80) a captured letter dated july 1968 concerning the conduct of security activities in ben tre province called upon components of the security service to try to destroy 50 percent of the GVN's administrative, police, and public security agencies at provincial, city, and district levels during a forthcoming phase of the offensive. key cadres from the police, security, military, intelligence, and psychological warfare agencies, along with village and hamlet administrative council members, were pinpointed as the main targets for liquidation. (81) Continue with Text
References
 (73) for example, Doc. log No. 01-2766-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 20,197, dated january 20, 1969, and Doc. log No. 01-2818-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 20,230, dated january 31, 1969. (74) Doc. log No. 11-1771-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 18,033, dated november 19, 1968. summary of a "Recapitulation Report" dated october 30, 1968, which reviews the political struggle movement in binh dinh province during the months prior to october 20, 1968, and provides lessons for future political struggles. captured by the capital rok infantry division on november 6, 1968. (75) Doc. log No. 01-2762-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 20,195, dated january 30, 1969. summary of a directive dated november 10, 1968, which provides guidance to province units concerning the tasks of guerrilla and self-defense units during a forthcoming campaign. this directive is attributed to the political Department, Headquarters, military region V. captured by the capital rok infantry division on january 4, 1969. (76) Doc. log No. 01-2773-69 (Confidential),summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 20,203, dated january 30, 1969. summary of a top secret plan dated december 12, 1968, attributed to an agency of the binh dinh province Unit, military region V, which provides guidance on military proselytizing activities in a forthcoming campaign. captured by the capital rok infantry division on january 4, 1969. (77) Doc. log No. 10-1003-68 (Confidential), dated november 23, 1968. translation of directive (in draft form) dated june 19, 1968, concerning the "Strategy and tactics of launching permanent and continuous attacks against the enemy during military campaigns and Operations." this directive is believed to have been prepared by the tri- thien-hue military Region. captured by the 196th light infantry Brigade, americal Division, on september 9, 1968. (78) Doc. log No. 11-1520-68. (79) Doc. log No. 07-3297-68 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 15,030, dated july 31, 1968. summary of an undated attack plan prepared by an agency in the quang da special Zone, with details for an attack to be launched against an unspecified city. captured by the 11th light infantry Brigade, americal Division, on july 23, 1968. (80) Doc. log No. 08-1045-68 (Confidential), dated august 15, 1968. translation of a notebook dated june 30, 1968, concerning the activities of district agencies in thua thien Province. captured by the 1st usmc Division, iii MAF, on july 21, 1968. (81) Doc. log No. 02-5567-69 (Confidential), summarized in MACJ2 bulletin No. 16, dated march 6, 1969. summary of letter dated july 1968, and containing instructions on the conduct of security activities in ben tre city and its outskirts during a forthcoming phase of hostilities. this letter is attributed to the security Section, ben tre province Unit, military region II. captured by the 9th U.S. infantry division in february 1969. 
Glossary
ARVN: army republic of vietnam CDEC: combined document exploitation center CIO: central intelligence organization COSVN: central office of south vietnam GVN: government of south vietnam MP: military police MPS: ministry of public security MR: military region MSS: military security service RVN: republic of vietnam RVNAF: republic of vietnam armed forces SVN: south vietnam USMC: united states marines Corp. VNQDD: vietnam quoc dan dang